



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

Government Organization in War Time and After. By WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1919. 8vo., pp. xix+370. \$2.50 net.

The purpose of this volume, it is stated, is to attempt a methodical statement and description of the various war agencies and services especially created in the effort to mobilize the economic resources for the more effective prosecution of the war and the methods of their operation. It thus does not take up, except incidentally, the work of previously existing agencies and services, such as the War, Navy, and Treasury departments. The special topics covered include: general administration; the mobilization of science, publicity agents, finance, industry, foreign trade, shipping, inland transportation and communication, labor, food, and fuel; control of enemy aliens and supporters; aircraft construction; and war-risk insurance.

Under each topic the problem is stated, the measures taken to meet it described, and the results summarized. Extensive use has been made of quotations from official statements, laws, proclamations, etc., which have been selected with discrimination, and which add to the accuracy and usefulness of the work. It is to be regretted that there are practically no references to other sources of information except to the forthcoming books in the same series. These summary accounts are well balanced, clear, and bring out the more obvious features of the different problems. But the deeper underlying aspects of many of the problems are seldom emphasized, and critical discussion of the measures adopted, though generally sound, has been indulged in very sparingly. As a result we have an excellent descriptive and narrative summary; for the field covered, extremely useful; and distinctly the best now available. And yet the opportunity open was such that one is disappointed that no more was accomplished.

The volume is one of a series entitled "Problems of the War and Reconstruction." The rest of the volumes in the series, it would appear, will each be devoted to a detailed account of some one of the special topics touched upon in this volume. Hence, in the words of the Preface, "What value the present work may have is thus that of furnishing a

general survey or picture of the whole problem of organization for the prosecution of the war and the manner in which this problem was met by the government." Such being the case, the question at once arises why, if the object is to present a general survey of the whole problem of organization, the author should choose to deal only with the activities of the newly created services and omit other economic activities just because they happened to be carried on by branches of the government that had been organized previously. The disastrous result is most marked in dealing with the mobilization of capital, where the author's account is practically limited to the work of the Capital Issues Committees and the War Finance Corporation. It goes without saying that a study of the mobilization of the capital resources of the country for war which leaves out all government financing, the activities of the Treasury, and the banking system is about as useful and intelligible as a presentation of *Hamlet* with the hero omitted.

The topical method chosen is doubtless the best, but it involves the danger of ignoring the interdependence of the various factors and the real complexity of the problem. Though these interacting factors are frequently pointed out, yet the general impression left with the reader is that the problem was far less complicated than it proved in fact. It was exactly because of the failure to study such interrelations that we had the labor, housing, transportation, and other troubles in such places as Bridgeport, arising from the congestion of war contracts. It was this same complexity which made the scarcity of shipping, inadequate terminal facilities, and foreign-trade requirements in part responsible for the coal famine. Then too, there are the still broader problems of the relation of the mobilization of our economic resources to the similar problem of the Allies, which are only occasionally dwelt upon, and the relation of economic mobilization to military and diplomatic strategy. But perhaps this last is asking too much.

After all, however, the real character of the problem which this country had to face in its broadest and most fundamental aspects can only be described on the basis of a clear presentation of the characteristics of modern industrial society with its pecuniary, competitive, individualistic bases, and its specialized, interdependent, and complex form of organization. Why was it that the organization of industrial society which has been evolved for supplying our wants in times of peace had to be so altered, regulated, and controlled to supply our wants in time of war? And if the resulting modifications worked well in time of war, why not keep them on the return of peace? On the

answers to such questions, which are certainly most fundamental for an understanding of the problems of the government in its economic mobilization for war, the reader is afforded little light.

CHESTER W. WRIGHT

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Unsolved Riddle of Social Justice. By STEPHEN LEACOCK.

New York: John Lane Co., 1920. \$1.25.

"Social and economic theory is heavy to the verge of being indigestible. There is no such thing as a gay book on political economy for reading in a hammock" (p. 105). Nevertheless, even a book on political economy may be bound in a crimson cover. *The Unsolved Riddle of Social Justice* is a work by "Stephen Leacock, B.A., Ph.D., Litt.D., F.R.C.S., Professor of Political Economy at McGill University," written for the readers of Stephen Leacock, author of *Frenzied Fiction*, etc., and intentionally gotten up to resemble the nonsense novels in physical appearance.

But the style, though monosyllabic, is serious. After reviewing the social crisis brought on by the war, with inflated currency "lying upon the industrial landscape like snow" at home, and abroad "the fierce eyes and unshorn face of the real and undoubted Bolshevik, waving his red flag," and everywhere "the moving and shifting spectacle of riches and poverty, side by side, inextricable," he turns back to the industrial revolution and the beginnings of competitive enterprise. The contrast between the early hopes of the greatest happiness of all through the operation of enlightened self-interest, and the later facts of cut-throat competition and its attendant drift toward monopoly is clear enough, though brief and not particularly vivid. The author reserves his keenest shafts for his review of modern classical economics. Here Mr. Leacock's satirical powers are rather more in evidence than elsewhere. The cost-of-production theory of value, which serves him as a proxy for the science of political economy, comes in for a good ragging in the spirit of the younger group of "institutional" economists (who are not mentioned, however); a trained psychic might even sense the presence of the spirit of Mr. Veblen. Thereafter Edward Bellamy, as the embodiment of socialism, is torn limb from limb in the manner of Richard T. Ely. This sacrament having been duly performed, the limbs are gathered together again in a concluding chapter of suggestions for the future.